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Abstract
We analyze two different cases of entry regulation in professional markets:
first, when licensing is a requirement for becoming a professional (lawyers);
second, when entry and price restrictions are applied on a geographical basis
(pharmacists). Both cases are investigated within a circular model of local-
ized competition and heterogeneous players. The analysis reveals that licens-
ing introduces a selection mechanism which is effective in preventing entry of
inefficient players in markets with large ex-ante heterogeneity. Furthermore,
because in the second case excessive entry is reduced as the degree of hetero-
geneity increases, our analysis lends support to a policy that simultaneously
relaxes entry and price restrictions.
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1 Introduction
The degree of efficiency in markets for such liberal professions as lawyers, notaries,
architects, engineers and pharmacists has been the subject of extensive investigation
in Europe (European Commission, 2004).1 The high level of regulation characteriz-
ing the European market, in the form of either State regulation or self-regulation by
professional bodies, has been deemed by some as unnecessary and harmful, while by
others as compelling and vital. For the latter, regulation is usually sustained by argu-
ments associated with the so-called “public interest view” (i.e., regulation addresses
market failures due to asymmetric information, and/or externalities and/or public
good provision). In contrast, those supporting the “private interest approach”claim
that, due to regulatory capture, many regulatory mechanisms may serve the pri-
vate interests of professional bodies’ members more than those of the general public
(Becker, 1983; Peltzman, 1976; Philipsen, 2009; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). For
instance, in the case of entry restrictions, a requirement to have demonstrated basic
competence is clearly justified where consumers are not well placed to assess the
quality of service, as is usually the case in markets for professional services. This
has to be weighed against the risk that necessary qualification thresholds may be
set too high to constrain entry and thus benefit incumbent producers, who largely
control the professional bodies.
Based on the premise that in the real world some degree of firm heterogeneity is
the rule rather than the exception, in this study we deviate from the usual market
failure versus regulator capture arguments to provide a different and, in some sense,
1According to the EU Directive on Recognition of Professional Qualifications (2005/36/EC),
liberal professions are “those practised on the basis of relevant professional qualifications in a
personal, responsible and professionally independent capacity by those providing intellectual and
conceptual services in the interest of the client and the public”.
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complementary model for liberal professions, which allows an evaluation of the wel-
fare properties associated with 1) the entry requirement of licensing, 2) the entry
restrictions capping the maximum number of firms and 3) fixed or minimum prices.
Even within the European Union, professional regulation presents significant dif-
ferences among countries and professions, although there are also some important
similarities worldwide. As far as entry restrictions are concerned, for all professions
a university degree in the relevant field is required; for a subset of them (lawyers) the
exercise of the profession is conditional on the further acquisition of a licence which
is obtained by passing an examination and on spending a period of apprenticeship
under the supervision of a qualified professional (Kleiner, 2000). For other profes-
sions, e.g. pharmacists, no licensing is needed; in this case, however, rules on entry
based on demographic and geographic criteria often make it impossible to open a
new outlet in markets where such criteria are binding (Schaumans and Verboven,
2008).2
We propose a set-up that accommodates two main cases based on whether or
not a licence is required for the entry in the liberal profession. When licensing is not
required, entry is modelled as a two-stage game, where prospective entrants incur a
set-up sunk cost before starting production and the related competitive stage. To
account for licensing, we introduce a preliminary stage, where prospective profes-
sionals have to incur the licensing sunk cost before deciding whether to start their
activity or not. The opportunity cost of the time spent to complete the apprentice-
ship period largely determines the magnitude of the licensing cost. Thus, entry in
professions where licensing is required entails a three-stage process and two different
2Licensing and quantitative entry restrictions are not always mutually exclusive. For instance
in Italy they are both used to regulate entry into the notary profession, which is generally found
to be highly regulated across Europe (Philipsen, 2009).
3
sunk costs (i.e., the licensing cost as well as the production set-up cost as in the
no-licensing case)
Both types of entry games (i.e., with licensing and without) are analyzed in
this study by modeling the relevant market as a circular city model of localized
competition with heterogenous costs’ firms (Salop, 1979; Syverson, 2004; Vogel,
2008). To remain in keeping with the terminology used in the existing literature,
we will use the terms “professional” and “firm” interchangeably.
The two games have different informational structures, which impact on the
characteristics of the ensuing equilibrium. In the two-stage game, before moving to
the final stage, players have no information about their own production costs, while
in the licensing game, a professional learns her own cost after the licensing phase.
Thus, this second model entails a selection mechanism: only those professionals with
sufficiently low production costs will decide to enter the production stage by paying
the second set-up sunk cost.
We study the properties of the selection mechanism by focusing on how it re-
sponds to differences across markets in their supply-side characteristics. In partic-
ular, we investigate whether the upper threshold of the ex-post cost distribution
determined in the selection stage reacts to the degree of ex-ante cost heterogeneity
characterizing the potential entrants in a market. That is, we ask whether the selec-
tion mechanism is capable to weed out the least efficient professionals precisely in
those markets where there is a larger risk that relatively inefficient ones may enter.
Since the selection mechanism occurs only in the licensing game, we thus investi-
gate a potentially beneficial effect of maintaining licensing as an entry requirement in
liberal professions. Our findings indeed point out that following the licensing stage,
the selection mechanism induces a truncation from above of the ex-ante cost distribu-
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tion and that such truncation intensifies as the degree of ex-ante cost heterogeneity
increases. That is, the maximum level of cost draw guaranteeing non-negative prof-
its for an operative professional is inversely related with the ex-ante cost variance.
Our model thus predicts that only the professional with lower costs will decide to
become a professional and those with higher costs will move to other jobs as, e.g.,
in Leland (1979): “Doctors (or potential doctors) [...] may not be willing to remain
in (or enter) the market.. (p. 1329)”. Thus, our analysis suggests that licensing
may play a crucial role in determining high levels of efficiency across markets, and
especially in those markets where heterogeneity of prospective professionals is large.
Furthermore, this result provides an additional rationale for licensing, which, unlike
previous contributions, is obtained in the absence of informational asymmetry be-
tween the service providers and the buyers (Kleiner, 2000; Leland, 1979; Shapiro,
1986; Philipsen, 2009).
This model can be applied more in general to describe the entry decisions in
markets with localized competition. In this respect, our three-stage entry game
is related with the work of Syverson (2004). Apart from an alternative modelling
of the pricing competition stage, the focus of the two papers is rather different.
Syverson (2004) investigates how such demand-side characteristics as market density
can determine productivity differences across markets, while our main focus is on
the supply-side characteristics (i.e., cost heterogeneity) and the role of a regulatory
mechanism (i.e., licensing).
In the two-stage game without licensing we study the inter-play between a type
of regulatory restriction on entry and pricing, by focussing in particular on the
insights that can be gained by extending the analysis to the case of cost heterogenous
firms. Deneckere and Rothschild (1992) highlight the general property of excessive
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entry in circular city model of localized competition amongst homogeneous cost
firms. By introducing heterogeneous firms who decide whether to enter without
knowing their rivals’ costs, we show that excessive entry reduces as the degree of cost
heterogeneity increases. This is because the first-best number of firms increases with
cost heterogeneity faster than the free-entry one. Therefore, the gap between the
number of firms in the free-entry market equilibrium and the socially optimal number
of firms shrinks as cost heterogeneity expands. Our analysis also indicates that
uniform pricing, which may arise from recommended and fixed prices by professional
bodies, is likely to be a particularly harmful form of regulatory restriction.
The next Section describes real-world examples of entry restrictions in profes-
sional markets; it is followed by the model’s set-up and the characterization of the
equilibrium prices as well as the condition for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. The three-stage entry game with a selection mechanism is developed in
Section 4, which is followed by the two-stage entry game without licensing. Section
6 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs of all the Propositions, Lemmata
and Corollaries.
2 Entry qualifications in professional markets
In many countries, before an individual is allowed to practice a profession, a cer-
tain set of regulatory conditions must be fulfilled (Philipsen, 2009). Examples of
measures include minimum periods of education and/or professional experience,
mandatory registration, establishment requirements, licensing.
As a starting example, consider the legal profession in England and Wales, where
only those who are qualified as a lawyer (solicitor or barrister) may represent parties
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before a Court; note, however, that anyone, whether a qualified lawyer or not, is
able to give legal advice: extra-judicial legal advice is often given by non-lawyers in,
for instance, the fields of tax, business and planning. To enter the solicitor’s profes-
sion, candidates must undertake three phases of training, which are described in the
Solicitors’ Act 1974: an academic phase, a vocational one and a training contract
(Vickers, 2001, p. 52). The academic phase consists of a three-year undergraduate
degree in law; this is not binding, since individuals with a different undergraduate
degree may undertake a one-year extra full-time programme and be admitted to the
next stage if they pass the Common Professional Examination. The vocational step
(phase two) consists of the Legal Practice Course (LPC), a one-year postgraduate
qualification which is accredited by the Law Society, the professional association
and governing body of solicitors whose main duties include dealing with complaints
against solicitors and disciplinary matters, and issues practising certificates. Finally,
there is a two-year training contract (salaried) with a firm of solicitors, during which
the trainees gain experience of the practice of law in three areas of their choosing
under the supervision of a qualified solicitor. The training also covers topics which,
according to the Law Society, are best studied once students have some work experi-
ence (advocacy and oral communication, financial awareness and business accounts,
and ethics and client responsibilities). After fulfilling the training requirements
above, all solicitors in private practice must obtain a practising certificate (issued
annually) from the Law Society. To become a barrister, a similar process involving
three steps with a final pupillage period has to be followed. As far as the legal
profession is concerned, the above licensing process entailing, in addition to a rel-
evant university degree, the fulfilment of two mandatory requirements (passing of
an examination testing the necessary entry level competencies, plus an apprentice-
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ship period) appears to be largely prevalent in the EU, as the cases of France, Italy
and Germany in Paterson et al. (2007) indicate.3 However, in the USA prospec-
tive lawyers only have to sit the state bar examination as well as the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination to satisfy the moral character and fitness
standards in that state; in 43 jurisdictions they are required to take continuing
education courses following bar admission, i.e., there is no compulsory traineeship
period (see http://international.lawsociety.org.uk/ip/americas/610/practise).
The accountant profession offers another important distinction. In the UK,
France, Netherlands, Germany and Italy, the licensing model above applies only
to specific higher-level tasks, such as statutory auditing, which are exclusively re-
served to individuals possessing the necessary requirements and who are registered
with the relevant Recognised Supervisory Board (e.g., the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales - ICAEW, or “La Compagnie Nationale des
Commissaires aux Comptes - CNCC” in France). Other services (e.g., internal au-
dit, advice on financial controls, preparation of management accounts, bookkeeping)
are not regulated and can be performed by anyone (Vickers, 2001; Paterson et al.,
2007). For these non-statutory services, the licensing model is often replaced by a
certification system (Shapiro, 1986), where members to a professional accountancy
body (one which does not act as a Recognised Statutory Boards for statutory au-
dit) are individuals who have voluntarily enrolled themselves in a study programme
managed by the body itself; the body also acts as the guarantor for the programme’s
quality standards.4
3Similarly, in Upper Canada the licensing process consists of two components, which are taken
after the completion of a university degree: (a) licensing examinations; and (b) an articling pro-
gram, which is ten months in length. An online “professional responsibility and practice course”
must be completed during the articling term and requires completion of an assessment with the
licensee’s articling principal - see www.lsuc.on.ca/LicensingProcessSiteMap
4In England, two of these bodies have chartered status, i.e., they have received a formal State
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A third system of entry into a profession is one where a university degree in a
relevant programme is the only required qualification. This was the case for Spanish
lawyers until November 2011: law graduates were automatically eligible for admis-
sion to the local bar association, without any further requirements for training or
examinations. Under the new regime, specified in the Royal Decree of 16 June 2011,
law graduates will also need to complete a 2-year work experience placement and pass
a state exam (see http://international.lawsociety.org.uk/ip/europe/580/practise).
To become a pharmacist in Portugal, Sweden, Italy and Belgium, no license is re-
quired; this is not the case in Germany and Ireland, where the three-phases licensing
process applies (Paterson et al., 2007; Schaumans and Verboven, 2008).
3 The model
Consider a circular city of unitary length with uniform density D. There are N ≥ 2
equidistant firms located in n ∈ L ≡ {1, 2, .., N}. Firms have different unit variable
costs cn ≥ 0 with cn ∈ [cL, cH ] and offer an identical quality level θ > 0.5
The utility a consumer, who is located at distance d ∈ [0, 1/N ] from firm n,
obtains from buying a service is Ud,n = v − td − pn, where t is the unit transport
cost, pn is the uniform price charged by firm n and v is the reservation value (which
absorbs the quality level). We assume v sufficiently high so that each consumer buys
a unit of the good and the market is fully covered.
Let pn, pn−1 and pn+1 denote the prices charged by firm n and its two immediate
recognition. They are the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) and the Char-
tered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA).
5 Under quality observability, this set-up is isomorphic to one where firms’ heterogeneity is
modeled by allowing firms to have identical unit cost c but different quality levels θn ∈ [θL, θH ],
when cn = c− θn ∈ [cL = c− θH , cH = c− θL] for any n.
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neighbors.6
The marginal consumer between n and n+ 1 (n− 1) lies at a a distance SRn (SLn )
from firm n, where:
SRn =
pn+1 − pn
2t
+
1
2N
; SLn =
pn−1 − pn
2t
+
1
2N
(1)
Standard computations yield the set of first order conditions (Tirole, 1988, p.
283):
pn =
2cn + pn−1 + pn+1
4
+
t
2N
, n ∈ {1, 2, .., N} . (2)
3.1 Price Equilibrium
Following Eaton and Lipsey (1978), we keep the requirement that competition is
localized, that is, each firm competes with its two adjacent firms on the captive
market represented by the closer consumers located between them.
Condition 1 (No mill-price undercutting) SRn ≥ 0; SLn ≥ 0, for n ∈ L.
Firms do not reduce prices in such a way to grab all the market of one or both
1-step neighbors. From a technical viewpoint, Condition 1 rules out the possibility
that an inefficient firm is driven out of the market when it competes against highly
efficient neighboring rivals; it therefore imposes a limit on the maximum allowable
amount of cost heterogeneity in the model (Alderighi and Piga, 2010).
The price equilibrium with heterogenous firms presents a number of characteris-
tics which do not feature in the standard, homogenous firms case. Such characteris-
tics are now briefly illustrated, since they describe the equilibrium of the last stage
6 With a little abuse of notation, we use the convention that if n± i /∈ L, with i = 1, . . . , N − 1,
the index refers to a firm n± i∓N ∈ L.
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of the two entry games on which we focus the attention in this study.7
Define l (N) =
⌈
1−N
2
⌉
, and l (N) =
⌈
N−1
2
⌉
, where dxe is the approximation of x
to its larger integer.8
Lemma 1 If Condition 1 is satisfied, then system (2) has a unique solution. The
market equilibrium prices are given by:
p∗n =
∑l
i=l
wl−|i|cn+i + k, n ∈ L, (3)
where wi-s and k are constants.
Despite the localized competition assumption, the market equilibrium arises from
the interaction of a sequence of chain-linked, inter-locked sub-markets (Rothchild,
1982), where each firm’s cost affects the pricing of both direct and non-direct com-
petitors through a transmission mechanism whose properties are defined by the
weights in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 For any N ≥ 2 the weights wi and k in Lemma 1 are:
wi = 4wi−1 − wi−2 for i = 1, ..l − 1 (4)
w1 =
(
3− l − l)w0 (5)
4wl = 2 + 2wl−1 (6)∑l
i=l
wl−|i| = 1, (7)
k = t/N. (8)
First, weights decrease with distance, so that a shock in a firm’s costs propagates
throughout the market but has a larger impact on the price of its closer competitors.
7For more on the characteristics of this pricing equilibrium, see Alderighi and Piga (2012),
which focuses on its geographical properties and on how these impact on the competitive process
among vertically related firms.
8Through this notation, we can effectively manage the cases of N being odd or even, plus take
advantage of the symmetry of the locations around the two halves of a circle.
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Second, because weights sum to one, (3) is a generalization of the price equilibrium
in the standard case with identical cost firms. Third, weights are independent of the
cost differential between any pairs of firms, implying, for instance, that a high-cost
firm will assign the same weight to its own cost regardless of whether it faces a high-
or low-cost direct competitor.9
Lemma 3 Equations (3)-(8) represent a unique Nash price equilibrium in pure
strategies when Condition 1 is satisfied, i.e., if:
cH − cL < ρc (N) k, (9)
where k = t/N and ρc (N) = (wl − w0)−1.
Eq. (9) indicates the maximal cost heterogeneity such that there always exists
an indifferent consumer located between two neighboring producers, i.e. a high
cost firm facing tough competition from two low-cost neighboring rivals always has
a non-negative market share. Unlike the homogenous firms’ case, the vector of
market prices (3) induces a distortive allocative outcome where consumers who
should patronize a low-cost firm end up buying from a higher cost firm. Indeed, for
any N :
Lemma 4 The first-best full information allocative solution can be obtained by set-
ting:
pFn = cn + kF , (10)
where kF can be set freely with the only caution that the delivered price does not
exceed the reservation price of consumers.
9 To calculate the numerical values of the weights in (4)-(7), we use the following approximation
which holds for any i when N is large: wl = y = 1/
√
3; wl−i/wl−i−1 = x = 2 +
√
3; wl−i = y · x−i.
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From Lemmata 1, 2 and 4, after setting kF = k = t/N we can compare equi-
librium prices under the free market and first-best scenarios (for any N). Because
in the former case firms base their prices not only on their own costs (as in the
latter situation) but also on those of the opponents, it follows that in the market
equilibrium efficient low-cost firms charge prices above the first-best solution and
inefficient high-cost ones charge prices below it. A productive inefficiency arises be-
cause high-cost (low-cost) firms enjoy a larger (smaller) than optimal market share.
4 Entry with licensing
We model entry in liberal professions as either a three-stage or a two-stage game,
depending on whether the licensing requirement is present or not. The former case
is developed in this Section, while the latter in the next one. The last stage of both
types of game corresponds to the price competition of the previous Section.
There is an important difference between the two games. Licensing entails the
acquisition of information on a firm’s own level of efficiency which may induce some
firms to abandon the market before the actual entry stage, after they compare their
marginal cost (or intrinsic ability) with the average marginal cost that is expected
to prevail in the market. In other words, licensing triggers a selection mechanism
that restricts access to those firms whose cost levels fall in the lower part of the
ex-ante industry distribution of costs. While this truncation of the cost distribution
from above has been already discussed within a different informational set-up in
Syverson (2004), a novel result in this Section highlights the effectiveness of the
selection mechanism in relation to the degree of firm heterogeneity in the market.
More precisely, we show that the cost threshold below which actual entry takes place
decreases as the ex-ante cost heterogeneity increases.
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The timing of the licensing game is as follows:10
Stage 1 - Licensing; Out of a pool of Λ potential candidates, M ≤ Λ prospective
entrants decide to fulfill the legal requirement of obtaining a licence to exercise
a given profession; by investing FL they acquire private information on their
own cost but not on that of their rivals;
Stage 2 - Selection and actual entry; Firms decide whether to exit (i.e., they
pursue an outside option) or to enter the professional market by incurring a
set-up cost Fp to start production;
Stage 3 - Full Information Pricing; Prices are set under a full information sce-
nario; i.e., according to the Lemmata 1 and 2.
The first stage reflects the fact that not all the individuals with a relevant de-
gree seek to become licensed professionals. Stage 2 entails that some firms abandon
the market even if they have fulfilled all the necessary formal requirements. For
example, in both the legal and the medical profession it is not uncommon to ob-
serve individuals opting not to enter the profession even after obtaining the license
(Leland, 1979; Pashigian, 1977).
The value of Fp includes such expenses as, for instance, the present discounted
value of fees paid for the mandatory membership to Professional Bodies, the time
spent to set up the practice, to hire collaborators, etc.
The licensing cost FL arises as a consequence of a number of aspects. While
the cost to acquire a university degree is not sunk, as the degree can be used to
10There is an important difference between the structure of our game and that presented in
Syverson (2004) where firms set their prices based only on their cost type but not on their rivals’
actual cost realizations. While this may be a realistic assumption in the short-run, our approach
closely mimics a complete information, long-run equilibrium where firms have learnt to set prices
from which they would not unilaterally want to deviate (which, given Lemmata 1 and 2, implies a
full knowledge of all the firms’ costs and locations as in Vogel, 2008).
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pursue a number of alternative career options, during the apprenticeship period a
prospective professional, e.g., someone who has recently gained a degree in Law,
has to combine the general know-how obtained from the university studies with the
acquisition of the knowledge of both job-specific skills and practical aspects of the
profession. This process, which determines a professional’s intrinsic productivity,
is highly idiosyncratic and therefore is unlikely to yield a purely deterministic out-
come, in the sense that, for instance, individuals with good academic credentials
may not necessarily be very apt to tackling the more practical or relational aspects
of the profession. Indeed, as noted by Holmstrom (1999), productive abilities are
revealed over time through the observation of performance, and therefore by the
end of the apprenticeship period, prospective professionals become aware of their
efficiency (i.e., production cost). The magnitude of the licensing cost is therefore
represented by the opportunity cost of foregoing remunerated job opportunities dur-
ing the apprenticeship period. This is assumed to be the same for all the prospective
professionals, since they all have an identical outside option, as it would be the case
for graduates with little or no previous work experience.
To derive the properties of the entry game equilibrium, we assume that costs are
identically and independently distributed:
Assumption 1 Let c˜n ∈ [cL, cH ] be a random variable with cumulative distribution
G, density g, mean value E [cn] = c¯, variance E
[
(cn − c¯)2
]
= σ2 and covariance
E [(cn − c¯) cm] = 0, ∀n,m ∈ L and n 6= m.
We solve the model by backward induction. The firms’ profits in stage 3 are com-
puted using Lemmata 1 and 2 and the restriction (9) on maximal cost heterogeneity
is maintained.
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4.1 Selection
In the second stage, a generic firm n knows cn, M and the prior distribution of costs
G. Because costs are randomly and independently distributed, learning its own cost
does not change a firm’s beliefs on its rivals’ costs. Nonetheless, in the selection
phase firms can form their beliefs as to the cost distribution that will emerge in
the price competition stage, where only a subset N ≤ M of firms may be involved.
Based on such beliefs, each firm assumes a posterior distribution of the opponents’
costs Ge, which reflects each firm’s beliefs on its rivals’ decision on whether to stay
or exit the market. That is, the prior and posterior distribution may differ because
with a large cost heterogeneity, the producers drawing a sufficiently high cost expect
to gain profits that are below the fixed set-up cost Fp and therefore abandon the
market before entering production.
Under the assumption that there is at least one opponent that is going to enter
the market, the expected profit (gross of pre-entry fee FL) of firm n, if it enters the
market (together with N − 1 ≥ 1 other competitors) is:
EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
=
D
2t
· EGe [(p˜n − cn) · (p˜n−1 + p˜n+1 − 2p˜n + 2k)]− Fp
=
D
t
· EGe [(p˜n − cn) · (p˜n−1 − p˜n + k)]− Fp, (11)
where EGe means that the expectations are taken using firm n’s posterior cost
distribution on the actual entrants, Ge and the superscript ∼ denotes stochastic
variables. The second line in (11) derives from the fact that in stage 2 firm n treats
p˜n−1 and p˜n+1 in an identical manner. Further, even if firm n is a monopolist, its
profit must be bounded from above, since it is limited by the consumers’ willingness
to pay v. Therefore:11
11The case of monopoly can generate problems of existence of equilibria when the market is too
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EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, 1,M
]
= D (v − cn − t/2)− Fp <∞. (12)
Define c¯e = EGe (cn+i), σ
2
e = EGe (cn+i (cn+i − c¯e)), ∀i 6= 0.
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 1,
a) for N = 1, the expected profit of firm n is given by (12); for N ≥ 2:
EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
=
D
t
(
(wd (c¯e − cn) + k)2 +WL (N)σ2e
)− Fp, (13)
where wd = (1− wl) =
(
wl − wl−1
)
, WL (N) =
∑
i=L0 wl−|i|
(
wl−|i+1| − wl−|i|
)
>
0, L0 ≡ L\ {0}, limN→∞WL (N) = W¯L = 29
√
3 − 1
3
' 0.051567 and limN→∞wd =(
1− 1/√3) ' 0.42265.
b) EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
is decreasing in cn and Fp, and increasing in c¯e, σ
2
e and D.
Values of WL (N) are given in Table 1. Provided that cost differentials are
sufficiently small, Lemma 5 holds for each firm and for each possible N . Thus,
sequential rationality leads to the conclusion that each firm expects that the op-
ponents deciding to enter the market are sufficiently efficient, i.e., their cost is
not greater than a threshold level α. Therefore, the posterior distribution of such
firms’ costs corresponds to the prior distribution G(x) truncated at α. That is,
Ge (x) = Gα (x) = min {G (x) /G (α) , 1}.
Conjectures on α ∈ [cL, cH ] also affect the number of firms that participate to
the production stage: N˜ = N˜ (α,M). Since cost distributions are independent, we
compute the probability that there are η ≤ M (including n) firms whose costs fall
small for two firms but large enough for one firm. See for example Levin and Peck (2003) for a
detailed analysis on entry with at least two potential entrants.
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Table 1: The sequence of equilibrium parameters in the Entry Games (percentage
values).
N 2 3 4 5 8 12 20 ∞
WI 22.222 24.000 23.611 23.269 23.030 23.020 23.020 23.020
WL 11.111 8.000 6.250 5.540 5.169 5.157 5.157 5.157
under the entry threshold α:
ωη = Pr
(
N˜=η
)
=
(
M
η
)
G (α)η (1−G (α))M−η .
It follows that if firm n decides to enter the market, provided that in the first
stage there are M firms, its expected profit is:12
∑M
η=1
ωηEGα
[
Π˜n|cn, η,M
]
, (14)
which represents the expected profit in the selection phase for given cn, M and
α. Equivalently, for M large, the central theorem guarantees that N˜(α,M) →
N(α,M) = G (α)M since ωN → 1 ; (14) becomes:
EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
= EGα
[
Π˜n|cn, G (α)M,M
]
(15)
In the subsequent analysis, we assume M large so that the expected profit can
be approximated by equation (15). Note that EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
retains most of the
properties of EGe
[
Π˜n|cn, N,M
]
in Lemma 5, i.e.
Lemma 6 EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
is increasing in D and decreasing in cn, Fp and M .
On the one hand, we are mainly interested in the comparative static analysis
12When firm n decides to enter the market it has costs lower than or equal to α and expects
that the other firms entering the market have costs lower than or equal to α.
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concerning the impact of a change in cost heterogeneity on the expected profit; on
the other, this is not a straightforward task to investigate because the expected
profit in (15) is not only affected by the variance of the prior cost distribution σ,
but it depends on c¯α, σα and G (α), i.e., the mean, the variance and the shape of
the posterior distribution. In order to avoid unnecessary complications, we assume
that G is uniformly distributed.13
Assumption 2 Let G = {Gσ, σ ∈ (0, σˆ]} be a family of uniform distributions with
average c¯ and variance σ2.
Define Φ (α,M, σ) = EGσα
[
Π˜n|α,M
]
as the expected profit of the least efficient
firm (cn = α) remaining in the market of size N = G
σ(α)M after selection.
Lemma 7 EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
is decreasing in α.
Since EGσα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
is decreasing in α the expected profit of a generic firm n
is negatively affected by an increase in α and the subsequent higher number of com-
petitors, even if these are on average slightly less efficient. Thus, if Φ (cH ,M, σ) < 0,
then for every M , there exists an α∗, such that: EGα∗
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
≶ 0 when cn ≷ α∗.
Therefore, the optimal entry threshold α∗ is implicitly given by:
EGα∗
[
Π˜n|α∗,M
]
= 0 (16)
Lemma 8 Given (16), under Assumption 2 and Φ (cH ,M, σ) < 0:
dα∗
dM
<0;
∂α∗
∂D
|M>0. (17)
13The following analysis holds for a broader class of distributions, see: Alderighi and Piga
(2012b).
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Moreover, when Φ (cH ,M, σ) > 0, α
∗ = cH so that: dα
∗
dM
= 0; ∂α
∗
∂D
|M = 0. Note
how the second inequality of (17) seems to suggest that an increase in the market
density D allows more inefficient firms to profitably stay in the market. However,
this is not an equilibrium result for the full game because the partial derivatives in
Lemma 8 are calculated for fixed M ; hence they do not capture how a change in D
affects the equilibrium number of firms in the pre-entry stage.
4.2 Licensing stage
The number of firms entering the licensing stage is obtained by assuming that firms
correctly anticipate the outcomes of both the selection and the pricing stages. Prior
to paying the licensing fee FL, firm n is unaware of its own type cn, so it can base
its entry decision only on the expected profit it would gain, which is a function of
the endogenously determined number of entrants M into the licensing stage. All
firms acquiring a licence enter the selection stage, but only if cn ≤ α∗, firm n starts
production after paying Fp, gaining EGα∗
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
; otherwise it stays out and
gains 0.
From (15) and Assumption 2, the expected profit of a firm deciding to enter the
licensing stage, gross of the entry fee FL, depends, amongst other things, on the
prior and posterior distributions of costs G and Gα∗ and on the value of α
∗:
E
[
Π˜n|M
]
=
∫ α∗
cL
EGα∗
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
dG (cn) (18)
Lemma 9 Under Assumption 2, E
[
Π˜n|M
]
is monotonically decreasing in M .
Therefore, we can use the zero-profit condition to determine the equilibrium
number of entrants in the first stage, MS:
E
[
Π˜n|MS
]
= FL, (19)
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and NS = MSG (α
∗ (MS)). Under Lemma 9 the solution is unique.
4.3 Main Results
The next two Propositions report comparative static results: the first constitutes
the main thrust of this Section and shows new insights into the functioning of the
selection mechanism by deriving predictions on the relationship between the trunca-
tion point of the prior distribution α∗ and the variance of the same distribution, the
latter being a measure of firm heterogeneity; the second analyzes the link between
selection and market density.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 2:
dMS
dσ
>0;
dα∗
dσ
≶ 0 if Φ (cH ,MS, σ) ≶ 0. (20)
The first inequality confirms the result presented in Lemma 5.b), that cost vari-
ance increases expected profits and hence the number of potential entrants. Indeed,
expected profits are convex in ci so that, for the Jensen inequality, E (Π(c˜)) >
Π(E(c˜)) (Spulber, 1995). Thus, cost heterogeneity has a positive effect on MS: as
more potential professionals are attracted into the market, competition intensifies.
This implies an increase in proximity among firms, and greater possibility for con-
sumers to substitute one firm’s services with another. Selection, and the associated
exit of high-cost firms, takes place because these firms perceive they cannot compete
adequately with low-cost ones, if the cost gap is sufficiently high and, therefore, they
prefer to exit since, in the competition stage, it is unlikely that they will recover the
second set-up sunk cost due to their low efficiency.
The selection mechanism induced by cost heterogeneity is formally illustrated in
the second inequality. The cut-off point α∗, i.e., the level of cost at which the prior
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distribution is truncated, is not effective when the expected profit Φ (cH ,MS, σ) of
a firm with cost cH is non-negative. That is, α
∗ = cH if Φ (cH ,MS, σ) > 0.
However, when selection is active, i.e. α∗ < cH because expected profits are neg-
ative at cH , the cut-off point is negatively related to cost heterogeneity. Therefore,
there exists a value of the cost gap (cH − cL) beyond which a progressive truncation
at α∗ < cH of the prior cost distribution occurs: the thrust of Proposition 1 is to
show that the cut-off point α∗ reduces as the cost gap goes beyond a certain level.
The analysis thus bears important policy consequences: the selection mechanism
becomes more severe precisely in those situations where it is more needed, that is,
when there is a risk that highly inefficient firms may remain and operate in the
market.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2,
dα∗
dD
<0;
dMS
dD
>0;
dMS
dFL
<0; (21)
The first inequality mirrors the theoretical predictions in Syverson (2004): the
upper bound of the firms’ posterior cost distribution decreases in demand density.
Part of the explanation of this result is associated with the second inequality: more
firms enter the licensing stage in denser markets, attracted by a higher level of ex-
pected profit. Therefore, an increase in density plays a qualitatively similar role as
cost variance. Because the average distance separating any two firms reduces, their
products become closer substitutes and the ensuing intensification of competition
makes it less likely for a high-cost firm to retain any positive market share. The pos-
terior cost distribution obtains therefore from a truncation of the prior distribution
from above, whose magnitude is larger in denser markets.
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It is not easy, however, to derive a clear-cut prediction with regards to the impact
of market density on the equilibrium number of firms, NS. In this case, a direct and
an indirect effect are at play:
dNS
dD
=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dMS
dD
G (α∗) + g (α∗)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dα∗ (MS)
dM
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dMS
dD
MS R 0 (22)
On the one hand, in a denser market larger profits intensify entry in the first
stage, thereby also increasing the number of firms in the production stage (direct
effect); on the other, the competitive pressure from a larger number of firms push
towards the exclusion of less competitive firms (indirect effect). The overall effect
depends on the net balance between these two forces. Simulations obtained assuming
a uniform distribution suggest that the first effect dominates: NS is increasing in D
but at a lower rate than MS.
Finally, the third inequality constitutes a standard result, which has however
important implications in professional markets. On the one hand, a higher licensing
fee discourage potential entrants, thereby creating a potential restriction to entry
and therefore to competition; on the other, the licensing sunk cost plays a crucial
role and its elimination would be likely associated with efficiency losses. Indeed,
Proposition 1 shows that the licensing stage induces self-selection of most efficient
professionals in situations where heterogeneity is large.
Figure 1 further illustrates how the selection mechanism operates as a function
of the cost gap (which is a proxy for variance) cH − cL. For low levels of the cost
gap, the optimal number of firms in the licensing stage and in the production stage
coincide (MS = NS and α
∗ = cH). That is, there is no selection when heterogeneity
is small in magnitude. However, as heterogeneity increases, the selection mechanism
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Figure 1: The optimal number firms in the pre-entry stage M and in the production
stage N (left scale). Optimal entry threshold (right scale). FL = 0.2, Fp = 0.8,
c¯ = 0.1, cH−cL∈ [0, 0.14], D = 100 and t = 1.
determines a cut-off point after which α∗ <cH and MS increases at a fast rate. When
the decision to enter is made under uncertainty, an increase in the costs’ variance
leads to an increase in the expected profit in the licensing stage, even when firms can
anticipate that in the subsequent selection stage a number of firms will not continue.
In Figure 1, the selection mechanism is responsible for: 1) the decreasing trend in
NS due to α
∗ being decreasing in cost variance when selection is in place; 2) the exit
of the MS−NS least efficient firms (MS−NS also increases with variance); 3) the
increase in the average level of market efficiency, c¯e =
α∗+cL
2
< c¯.
To sum up, the foregoing analysis, in addition to being able to replicate some
recent results explaining the relatively higher efficiency of firms operating in denser
markets, has illustrated how the licensing stage may have beneficial implications for
allocative efficiency even in the absence of the traditional rationales generally advo-
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cated to justify licensing as a regulatory instrument in liberal professions (Philipsen,
2009). Indeed, our set-up abstracts from any form of market failure due to informa-
tional asymmetries, negative externalities or the provision of a public good (Kleiner,
2000). Nonetheless, we obtain that the licensing stage is instrumental in allowing a
selection mechanism to operate by driving inefficient firms out of the market. Most
importantly, our main prediction is that such a mechanism is more restrictive in
markets characterized by higher levels of ex-ante cost heterogeneity.
4.4 Compulsory vs. voluntary apprenticeship
The foregoing analysis suggests that licensing, modeled as a period of compulsory
apprenticeship, can be welfare enhancing since it makes professionals learn about
their type: they decide whether to incur the entry production cost only if they
find out their type is low enough. Therefore, there appears to be a private benefit
for professionals from undertaking a period of apprenticeship. In this section, we
analyze the circumstances under which licensure can be replaced by a voluntary
apprenticeship scheme into which the potential entrants find it in their own interest
to enrol. The analysis will also investigate the rationale for not having either forms
of apprenticeship.
To derive Figure 2, we consider two different scenarios, one in which the firms pay
an apprenticeship cost FL and learn their type, the other where they do not incur
the cost and therefore are unaware of their type when they enter the production
phase. In the first scenario, the parameter values are such that selection is always
active (D = 100, Fp = 0.8, t = 1, cL = 0.05, cH = 0.15).
The social gain function in Figure 2 is obtained by calculating the difference
between the social welfare in the second scenario, i.e., when compulsory licensure or
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Figure 2: Voluntary vs. compulsory apprenticeship.
voluntary apprenticeship are ruled out, and the social welfare arising from having
the potential entrants undertaking a stage where they learn their own type (i.e.,
the first scenario). For FL < 0.17, not having any form of apprenticeship is welfare
reducing. Intuitively, for a given ex-ante cost heterogeneity, when apprenticeship
costs are high, the benefits from excluding inefficient firms are outweighed by the
excessive burden due to the apprenticeship scheme.
From an individual viewpoint, the private incentive to undertake the apprentice-
ship varies with its cost. When FL is below 0.10, the expected profit from skipping
the apprenticeship scheme (when everyone else does it) is lower than the one when
the apprenticeship is undertaken. This is because the apprenticeship has an option
value: buying it allows a high-cost firm the possibility to exit to avoid negative
profits, whereas, without it, the same type of firm would not exit and would face
tough competition (i.e., would make negative profits). Similarly, when everyone is
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skipping the apprenticeship, there is a private benefit from doing it. Therefore, when
FL is low enough, every potential entrant finds it privately profitable to enter an
apprenticeship scheme and there is no need for a compulsory licensure. However,
for intermediate values of FL, every individual would find it beneficial to skip the
apprenticeship stage, although it is socially desirable. In such a case, there is room
for compulsory entry regulation.
From a policy viewpoint, the entry mechanism depends crucially on the value
of FL. In practice, this largely depends on the requirements set in the licensing
process. While, on the one hand, it guarantees that the professional has achieved a
minimum level of competence, on the other it is necessary to consider the incentives
that professional bodies face to inflate the period of apprenticeship and the difficulty
of the examination, thereby reducing the number of firms and thus raising the rents
for the incumbents (Leland, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1981; Shapiro, 1986). In some
cases, larger entry costs can reduce the number of potential entrants and can lower
the quality of the service (Kleiner, 2000). Using data on US labor market after
controlling for gender, age, race and education level, Kleiner and Krueger (2011)
and Weeden (2002) find that licensing occupations receive a premium of about 9%
and 18%, respectively. In the US dentistry market, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find
that tougher licensing thresholds do not improve the quality of the service, but
raise earnings of practitioners. These situations are consistent with our results if we
suppose that entry costs FL are proportional to the duration of licensure τL, and
that prospective professionals become fully aware of their type after a period τ0. A
socially inefficient outcome arises whenever τL > τ0. This may provide a rationale
for the decision taken by the Italian Government led by PM Monti, which decreed
to shorten the apprenticeship period of many professions (see D.L. N. 1, 24/01/12).
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4.5 Licensing and quality
The results obtained thus far rule out information asymmetries between buyers and
sellers (i.e. quality is observable). As suggested in fn. 5, reinterpreting the results in
Propositions 1 and 2 in terms of quality θn implies that market selection operates to
exclude firms with lower quality and firms entering in the production stage are those
with higher quality. Because of Proposition 1, the selection mechanism is more effec-
tive when there are high ex-ante quality differences among prospective professionals,
and so some forms of voluntary or compulsory apprenticeship may be welfare im-
proving. Moreover, a higher degree of ex-ante heterogeneity provides larger private
and social incentives to enter the selection phase, therefore increasing the number of
participants and the quality of selected ones. Hence, the selection mechanism works
to reduce the ex-post heterogeneity especially when quality differences are high.
In the extant literature, licensure is seen as a training period which may enhance
professional competencies (Shapiro, 1986). In our set-up, if we further assume that
quality increases with the length of the training period, having a licensing phase
turns out to be more beneficial than before: in addition to the selection mechanism
(which shakes out lower quality workers), licensure increases the average quality of
the professionals. The two effects reinforce each other: the selected professionals
have higher quality, and consumers receive larger utility. In practice, if the appren-
ticeship period increases by δ the quality of all trainees, in equilibrium, there is
the same number of prospective practitioners M and professionals N ; the quality
adjusted prices reduces by δ; social benefits increase by δD and consequently, there
is shift to the right of the critical thresholds depicted in Figure 2.
Different quality perception among consumers may lead to different forms of
market organization. For instance, when quality is appreciated by some customers
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more than others, there is room for some professionals to take a voluntary decision
to invest in additional quality (e.g. a certificate). Iossa and Jullien (2010) analyze
the market for lawyers and show that being certified increases the rate of success
in litigations. This is because less experienced lower-court judges, who are more
concerned about their careers’ prospects, tend to support more favorably the theses
of certified lawyers than those of uncertified ones. The authors point out that
there can be an excessive number of certified lawyers. Shapiro (1986) contrasts the
case of certification and licensing when there is imperfect observability of quality.
He also finds that under certification, there is excessive investment (signalling) by
professionals. In his set-up neither licensing or certification dominates the other.
Our set-up can be extended to discuss the case of imperfect observability of
quality when reputation matters. This can be done by assuming, as in Shapiro
(1986), that the pricing stage is divided into two different periods, one lasting W
and the other 1−W . In the first period, lawyers are young and they have not already
revealed their quality to consumers (they have no reputation), and consequently their
remuneration is uniform and independent from their types. In the second period,
thanks to direct experience, word-of-mouth or availability of public information
on lawyer performance (Iossa and Jullien, 2010), consumers can distinguish good
lawyers from bad ones, and the high quality professionals receive a higher pay.
Because, before acquiring a good reputation, the better professionals cannot gain
larger revenues as their quality is indistinguishable from that of bad types, the
selection mechanism is less effective. Imperfect observability therefore plays against
the possibility to encourage a larger participation in the first stage, since in the
second stage the difference in returns that accrue to good or bad lawyers is less
pronounced than in the case where quality is immediately observable. In turn, this
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corresponds to a shift to the left of the critical thresholds in Figure 2.
5 Entry without licensing
For some professions, acquiring a relevant university degree is the only formal con-
dition to start production. For instance, in Belgium and Portugal all individuals
gaining a degree in pharmaceutical sciences do not need to satisfy any further edu-
cational requirement and are consequently deemed qualified to run an establishment
in any part of the country (Paterson et al., 2007; Schaumans and Verboven, 2008).
There is, therefore, no licensing stage involved. However, in Belgium and Portugal,
as well as in most EU countries, the number of pharmacies allowed to operate within
a given geographic area is fixed and depends on the area population.
Quite interestingly, in such countries as Ireland and Germany, where pharmacists
have to undertake a full licensing process that involves an apprenticeship period and
an exam, geographical entry restrictions are not applied. It appears therefore that
licensing and geographical entry restrictions constitute mutually exclusive regula-
tory mechanisms, the presence of the latter being generally explained by the public
interest motive according to which unregulated markets would generate excessive
entry and therefore a lower level of social welfare (Philipsen, 2009).
We consider a two-stage entry game with the entry stage followed by the produc-
tion stage. This is directly obtained from the licensing entry game of the previous
Section by setting FL = 0, i.e., no licensing. Before entering, each potential entrant
only knows the costs distribution but has no information on the actual realization
of its own and its potential opponents’ costs, as in Assumption 1. In the first stage,
those potential entrants choosing to enter have to pay a set-up cost F , the others
remain out of the market and gain zero profit. After investing F and occupying a
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random equidistant location, in the production stage price competition takes place
among the N entrants as in Section 3, so that locations and costs are common
knowledge. We solve the model by backward induction. The price equilibrium in
the production stage is therefore given by Lemma 2 under the existence conditions
of Lemma 3.
5.1 Free market entry equilibrium
Firms are risk-neutral and have perfect foresight, so that they enter the market if
their expected profit is non-negative. Since costs are unknown in the first stage,
firm n’s random profit is:
Π˜n =
D
t
(p˜n − c˜n) ·
(
1
2
(p˜n−1 + p˜n+1)− p˜n + k
)
− F . (23)
Lemma 10 The expected profit of firm n is:
E
[
Π˜n |N
]
=
D
t
(
σ2WI (N) + k
2
)− F (24)
where WI (N) =
∑l
i=l wl−|i|
[(
wl − wl−1
)− (wl−|i| − wl−|i+1|)] > 0, with w−1 :=
wl+l; limN→∞WI (N) = W¯I = 1− 49
√
3 ' 0.23020.
The values of WI (N) are reported in Table 1: they monotonically decrease for
N ≥ 3, and rapidly converge toward W¯I . From Lemma 10, the expected profit
E
[
Π˜n |N
]
decreases in N and F and increases in D, σ and t.14 As in the licensing
game, the expected profits increase with cost heterogeneity. Because the profit
function is convex in ci, in the extreme case where any two adjacent firms’ costs are
14Taking the derivative of E
[
Π˜n |N
]
with respect to t, we obtain that the expected profit is
increasing in t when σ< k/
√
WI' 2.09k. In the support [cL, cH ] the maximal variance arises from
a distribution where all the mass is equally concentrated on the extremes: σ= (cH − cL)/2; hence,
under (9) the expected profit is always increasing in t for any distribution.
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perfectly negatively correlated, i.e., E [(cn − c¯) cn+1] = −σ2 and N is even, it can be
shown that the expected profit (24) reduces to E [Π] = D
t
(
k2 + 4
9
σ2
)−F.15 That is,
firms prefer to “gamble” even if there is a fifty-fifty chance of drawing a high cost.
Furthermore, when there is perfect positive pairwise correlation among costs, σ2 = 0
and the profits are the same as the case of no uncertainty and no heterogeneity.
Proposition 3 From Lemma 10, the equilibrium number of firms in the market,
NM , is implicitly given by the following equation: t/N
2
M +σ
2WI/t (NM) = F/D. For
N large, the number of firms is approximated by:
NM '
√
t
F/D − W¯Iσ2/t (25)
It is noteworthy that NM converges to the value in Salop (1979) when firms’
costs are identical, i.e., NM =
√
tD/F when σ2 = 0. More importantly, the game
with cost heterogeneity yields a higher number of firms in equilibrium, relative to
that in the traditional case. However, the two cases are not perfectly comparable
given the different informational structure they assume. Therefore, to gauge the
extent by which the free-entry outcome in the last Proposition is sub-optimal, we
need to derive the Pareto optimal outcome under cost heterogeneity.
5.2 Pareto Efficient Entry
In the spirit of Salop (1979), we now compare the free-entry market equilibrium in
Proposition 3 with the first-best optimum that would be chosen by a social planner.
It is worth stressing that relative to the welfare analysis in Salop (1979), introducing
cost heterogeneity brings about an extra distortion associated with the total pro-
duction cost incurred in the economy. This is captured by the difference between
15Perfect negative correlation is obtained when the 1-step neighbors of a cL-type firm are cH -
types, and vice versa. Calculations are available on request.
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the market equilibrium prices in Lemma 1 and the first-best prices in Lemma 4.
Indeed, the market equilibrium pricing rule induces an allocative inefficiency such
that consumers who should patronize a low-cost firm end up buying from a higher
cost firm, thereby increasing the total and average costs incurred in the industry. It
follows therefore that the first-best optimal number of firms chosen by a benevolent
social planner is such that it minimizes the expected sum of transport, production
and fixed costs (see Appendix, proof of Lemma 4).
Proposition 4 a) The first-best optimal number of firms is:
NF =
1
2
√
t
F/D − 0.5σ2/t. (26)
b) There is less excessive entry under cost heterogeneity, because W¯I < 0.5, so that
NM/NF < 2 when σ > 0.
Part b) of the Proposition refers to the fact that the ratio NM/NF = 2 when
firms are identical. Its corollary is that the greater the degree of heterogeneity,
the less excessive market entry is, with the proviso that condition (9) determines a
lower bound for NM/NF . The welfare-enhancing effect of cost heterogeneity could
be seen as unexpected, given the extra allocative distortion that the social planner
has to manage in this case. From Proposition 3 and eq. (39) in the Appendix, it
appears clear that an increase in variance raises a firm’s expected profit less that it
reduces the industry’s expected total cost (in particular, the average variable cost).
Therefore, the regulator is willing to allow more firms in the market, so as to shift
production towards the more efficient plants, since the gain from doing so offsets
the increase in expected transport cost. In other words, excessive entry is reduced
because the first-best number of firms, NF , increases with cost heterogeneity faster
than the free-entry one, NM .
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The overall implications of the foregoing analysis on the regulation of liberal
professions point in opposite directions. On the one hand, when we consider the
more realistic case of heterogeneous firms, the free market outcome tends to be more
closely aligned to the first-best equilibrium, thereby suggesting there is less need to
restrict the number of firms in professional markets with more heterogeneity. On the
other, in the model the distance between the two outcomes remains sufficiently large.
Indeed, numerical simulations show that NM/NF is indeed monotonically decreasing
in σ and reaches a minimum value around 1.78, when (cH − cL) in Lemma 3 takes
its maximum possible value (with F = t = 1, D = 100, c¯ = 0.1). Therefore, the
motivation for entry restrictions on the maximum number of firms advocated in
the public interest view appears to continue to be theoretically relevant also in our
setting.
5.3 Discussion
To further highlight the welfare-enhancing role of cost heterogeneity, consider the
following three different pricing schemes:
• uniform (e.g., fixed or minimum prices set by professional bodies correspond
to this case; equivalently, the regulator may not differentiate between differ-
ent types of suppliers, as in the case of the Belgian pharmacies described in
Schaumans and Verboven (2008), where urban and rural pharmacies are com-
pensated uniformly);
• market (prices are set according to Lemma 2);
• first-best (the marginal cost pricing in eq. (10)).
Each of these is characterized by a different expected average social cost, E [C(N)],
given by the sum of the expected average transport, production and fixed costs. An-
alytically, and without loss of generality, we have
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E [C(N)] =
4c¯+ k
4
+
NF
D
− σ
2
2k
χ, (27)
where χ = 0 under uniform pricing, χ ' 0.65 under market pricing, and χ = 1
under first-best pricing - see (39) in the Appendix for the first-best case. Note that
the cost associated to uniform pricing is not affected by σ, and that the three costs
coincide when σ = 0.16
Figure 3 plots E [C(N)] under the three pricing scenarios as a function of the
number of firms. It depicts the relative position of a number of possible outcomes:
F is the first-best solution; S is the second best solution (the social planner’s choice
of entrants when they set market prices); M is the free-market outcome; and U is
the social planner’s choice of entrants under uniform pricing. Assuming that the
first-best solution F cannot be implemented (e.g., due to lack of information about
cost heterogeneity), policy intervention should be determined on the basis of the
optimal mix between the possible price setting alternatives and the related entry
restrictions.
Figure 3 shows that uniform price regulation is dominated by the free-market
pricing outcome, and that it performs very poorly when heterogeneity is taken into
account.17 With regards to entry, the free market equilibrium in M , defined in
Proposition 3, tends to be less inefficient than U , suggesting that some form of
entry regulation may be needed. Indeed, the combination of free market prices with
entry restrictions on the number of firms (point S) constitutes a form of second-best,
since it entails a level of E [C(N)] only slightly above that of F , but is relatively
16They differ due to the impact that each pricing mechanism has on market shares, which in turn
affects the expected transport and production costs, as the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix
highlights.
17In a study of the U.S. real estate market, where commissions rates are fixed at the 6% level
and barriers to entry are very low, Hsieh and Moretti (2003) report evidence indicating that fixed
rates lead to highly wasteful entry.
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Figure 3: Expected average total cost under different pricing scenarios. F is the
social optimum; M is the free-market outcome; S is the second best solution (the
social planner’s choice of entrants when they set market prices). Under uniform
pricing, the planner’s choice is in U .
easier and less costly to implement than the first-best outcome since it does not
need information on firms’ costs.
To conclude, in the presence of sufficiently large cost heterogeneity, welfare im-
provements can be achieved by replacing uniform pricing with a policy combining
both entry restrictions and a price mechanism that more closely reflects firms’ un-
derlying costs. Our analysis therefore lends theoretical support and is largely con-
sistent with some policy recommendations found in the empirical literature. In their
counterfactual analysis on the Belgian pharmacies, Schaumans and Verboven (2008)
consider two policy measures and find that if the Belgian authorities: 1) relaxed the
restriction on entry by allowing twice as many outlets per given area population
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size, and at the same time 2) they cut the regulated prices non-uniformly by fa-
voring the pharmacies in smaller markets (which are likely to have higher costs),
then the number of pharmacies and the related geographical coverage would remain
very similar, if not slightly higher, than the pre-intervention period. Therefore, the
combined measures implicitly describe a regulatory intervention that would move
the Belgian pharmacies market from point U (i.e., fewer firms and uniform prices)
towards points F and S (slight increase in firms’ number and prices reflecting un-
derlying cost conditions) in Figure 3.18 Based on our analysis, such a move would
be welfare-enhancing.19
6 Conclusions
Professional services are a key sector in modern economies. Such a sector is charac-
terized, however, by high levels of regulation, resulting from a mix of State regula-
tion, self-regulation and custom and practice. In European Commission (2004), all
EU member States and competition authority were invited to assess to what extent
existing professional regulations and rules truly serve the public interest and can
be objectively justified. To this purpose, the Commission suggested the application
of a “proportionality test” according to which each regulatory measure should be
explained by an explicitly stated objective detailing how the chosen measure repre-
sents the least restrictive mechanism of competition to effectively attain the stated
objective. The Commission’s recommendation implicitly calls for further analysis
18Because market density is fixed at D in both cases, the number of firms per capita is therefore
larger under S.
19This conclusion is based on efficiency grounds - see eq. (27). However, if the regulator is more
concerned about equity (e.g., when public service obligation is mandated), then an analysis based
on the difference between the highest and lowest price (∆p = (cH−cL)χ) paid by consumers would
indicate that uniform pricing (χ = 0) should be clearly the most preferred solution. The market
pricing (χ = 0.65) would continue to be the intermediate one, and the first-best pricing (χ = 1)
scheme would be the one with the largest price dispersion.
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on the economic properties associated with each regulatory practice.
In this paper we have investigated the economic implications of regulations per-
taining both to entry requirements in professional markets and to price setting. Li-
censing appears to be particularly important in a market with heterogenous firms,
since it is capable to induce a mechanism such that only the most efficient firms in
the market become operative. Such a selection mechanism intensifies its effect as the
degree of heterogeneity increases. Our findings therefore point at a generally benefi-
cial effect of licensing, and may explain why a formal licensing law capturing many
features present in many Western World economies, has been recently introduced in
China for the legal professions (Philipsen, 2009).
For relatively simpler professional tasks, it is often argued that licensing may
constitute an excessively restrictive rule, which, if relaxed, might benefit consumers.
For example, prices dropped significantly in the United Kingdom after the lawyers’
reserved rights to provide conveyancing services were removed (European Commis-
sion, 2004). We investigate the extreme case of no licensing, to find that when the
first-best outcome cannot be implemented, the second-best policies should be aimed
at combining the greatest possible flexibility in price setting, so that prices reflect
the underlying efficiency of each firm, with some limits on the number of practition-
ers in the market. From a practical viewpoint, our analysis suggests, in line with the
evidence available in the literature, that a reform removing uniform pricing in favor
of a liberalized price setting system may also likely necessitate a re-adjustment of
the restrictive rules on entry based on a geographic market’s demographics.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. See Alderighi and Piga (2012).
Proof of Lemma 2. From Lemma 1, firm n equilibrium strategy is:
pn = wlcn + wl−1 (cn−1 + cn+1) + wl−2 (cn−2 + cn+2) + ...+ w0cn+l + k. (28)
By the same token, the price charged by the adjacent firms located at n − 1 and
n+ 1, respectively, are:
pn−1 = wlcn−1 + wl−1 (cn−2 + cn) + wl−2 (cn−3 + cn+1) + ...+ w0cn+l−1 + k
pn+1 = wlcn+1 + wl−1 (cn + cn+2) + wl−2 (cn−1 + cn+3) + ...+ w0cn+l + k. (29)
Now substituting (28) and both equations in (29) in (2), and collecting the similar
terms, we obtain:
cn
(
4wl − 2− 2wl−1
)
+ (cn−1 + cn+1)
(
4wl−1 − wl−2 − wl
)
+
+ (cn−2 + cn+2)
(
4wl−1 − wl − wl−2
)
+ ....+
+
(
cn+l + cn+l−1
)
(4w1 − w0 − w2) + cn+l (4w0 − 2w1) + (2k − 2t/N) = 0. (30)
In order for this equality to hold for every possible configuration of cn, n ∈ L,
all the expressions in round brackets must be equal to zero, thereby proving (4)-(6)
and (8). Finally, (7) emerges by replacing cn = c for n ∈ L in (30).
Proof of Lemma 3. See Alderighi and Piga (2012).
Proof of Lemma 4. We focus on the generic arc of length 1
N
defined by the
locations of firms n− 1 and n. Because demand is inelastic, the first-best allocative
solution is reached when the sum of production and transport costs is minimized.
Let dn and dn−1 =
(
1
N
−dn
)
be the distance of the pivotal consumer from two adjacent
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firms. The average distance between a generic consumer on the arc and the seller she
patronizes is: d¯ = N
(∫ dn−1
0
xdx+
∫ dn
0
xdx
)
= N
2
(
d2n−1 + d
2
n
)
. Hence, the average
transport costs among all consumers on the arc is:
TC = d¯t =
N
2
(
d2n−1 + d
2
n
)
t (31)
The proportion of consumers patronizing firm n − 1 and firm n are, respectively,
Ndn−1 and Ndn. The average (variable) cost of producing goods for a consumer is:
V C = Ndn−1cn−1 +Ndncn. (32)
The social planner problem can be expressed as mindn≥0 (TC + V C), yielding:
d∗n =
1
2N
+
(
cn−1−cn
2t
)
. Its implementation can be obtained by using the prices in
the Lemma as policy instruments.
Proof of Lemma 5. Multiply the terms within the square brackets in (11) to
obtain: E [p˜np˜n−1] − E [p˜2n] + E [p˜n] k − cnE [p˜n−1] + cnE [p˜n] − cnk. Each term is
derived separately. (See also: Alderighi and Piga, 2012b)
Part 5.I Under Assumption 1: EGe [p˜
2
n] = ((wlcn + (1− wl) c¯e) + k)2+σ2eWL.0 (N),
where WL.0 (N) =
∑
i=L0 w
2
l−|i|.
Derivation of Part 5.I. Using (3), E [cn] = cn, E [c˜n+i] = c¯e, E [c
2
n] = c
2
n,
E [cnc˜n+i] = cnc¯e, E
[
c˜2n+i
]
= (σ2 + c¯2e), with i ∈ L0 and E [c˜n+ic˜n+j] = c¯2, i, j ∈L0,
i 6= j: E [p˜2n] = E
[(
wl · cn +
∑
i=L0 wl−|i| · c˜n+i
)2]
+ 2 (wl · cn + (1− wl) c¯e) k + k2.
The expected value in the squared brackets can be written as: w2
l
c2n + 2wl (1− wl)
c¯ecn +
∑
i=L0 w
2
l−|i|σ
2
e +
∑
i,j=L0 wl−|j|wl−|i|c¯
2
e. Setting WL.0 (N) =
∑
i=L0 w
2
l−|i| and
noting that
∑
i,j=L0 wl−|j|wl−|i| = (1− wl)
2, we obtain (wlcn + (1− wl) c¯e)2 + σ2e
WL.0 (N). Summing up previous results completes the calculation. ♦
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Part 5.II Under Assumption 1: EGe [p˜np˜n−1] =
(
cnwl−1 +
(
1− wl−1
)
ce + k
)
(cnwl + (1− wl) ce + k) +WL.1 (N)σ2, where WL.1 (N) =
∑
i=L0 wl−|i|wl−|i+1|.
Derivation of Part 5.II. Similar to that of Part 5.I. ♦
a) To derive (13), substitute E [p˜n] = wlcn + (1− wl) c¯e + k, E [p˜n−1] = wl−1cn +(
1− wl−1
)
c¯e + kˆ and the results in Parts 5.I and 5.II into (11). After some simplifi-
cations we obtain the thesis. To compute W¯L and wd, use the numerical algorithm
for the weights in fn. 9. b) For (13) to be decreasing in cn, it sufficient that
wd (c¯e − cn) + k ≥ 0, which holds since
√
3k > cH − cL ≥ |c¯e − cn| from Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 6. It comes from the differentiation of (15).
Proof of Lemma 7. Let φ (α, cn,M, σ) = EGα
[
Π˜n|cn,M
]
and φx be the derivative
with respect to x evaluated at (α∗ (M) , cn,M, σ) , i.e. φx = ∂∂xφ (α
∗ (M) , cn,M, σ).
Set, henceforth, without loss of generality D
t
= 1. From (13), φ = A2 +WLσ
2
e − Fp,
where A = wd (c¯e − cn)+k. We must prove that φα = 2AAα+WLdσ2e/dα < 0. Under
Assumption 2, after taking the derivatives and dividing the result by 2 (α− cL), we
obtain:
(
c¯e−cn
α−cL wd +
k
α−cL
)(
1
2
wd − kα−cL
)
+ WL
12
< 0. By noting from Lemma 3 that
k > (cH − cL) /
√
3, after substituting wd ' 0.42 and WL ' 0.051, it emerges that
the first parenthesis is positive and the second one is negative. Simple computations
show that the first term is in magnitude greater than the last one.
Proof of Lemma 8. First inequality. Differentiating (16) with respect to α∗ and
M , we obtain: dα
∗
dM
= −ΦM/Φα which is negative since ΦM = φM < 0 from Lemma
6, and Φα = φα + φcn < 0 from Lemmata 6 and 7. The second inequality can be
obtained using similar arguments.
Proof of Lemma 9. Define:
Ψ (α,M, σ)=EGα
[
Π˜n|,M
]
=
∫ α
cL
(
(wd (c¯e − cn) + k)2 +WLσ¯2e − Fp
)
gdcn−FL. (33)
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Moreover, from (33), after computing the integral,
Ψ (α,M, σ)=
(
k2 +
1
12
(
w2d +WL
)
(α− cL)2 − Fp
)
α− cL
cH − cL − FL. (34)
We have to show that dΨ
dM
< 0. When Φ (cH ,M, σ) ≥ 0 then: Ψ =
(
t
M
)2
+
(WL + w
2
d)σ
2 − Fp − FL, which is clearly decreasing in M . When Φ (cH ,M, σ) < 0,
totally differentiating previous expression we obtain:
dΨ
dM
=
dα∗
dM
· φ (α∗, α∗,M, σ) g (α∗) +
∫ α∗
cL
d
dM
φ (α∗, cn,M, σ) g (cn) dcn, (35)
where the first term is null because φ (α∗, α∗,M, σ) = Φ (α∗,M, σ) = 0, and the last
term is negative from Lemma 6.
Proof of Proposition 1. Remember from (13) and Assumption 2 that:
Φ (α,M, σ)=
[
k − 1
2
wd (α− cL)
]2
+
1
12
WL (α− cL)2 − Fp. (36)
In order to determine the sign of dM
dσ
and dα
dσ
when Φ (cH ,M, σ) < 0, consider
the two equilibrium conditions: Φ (α,M, σ) = 0 and Ψ (α,M, σ) = 0. The former
determines the equilibrium of the production stage and the latter of the entry stage.
By totally differentiating these expressions, we obtain: Φαdα+ ΦMdM + Φσdσ = 0
and Ψαdα + ΨMdM + Ψσdσ = 0. Thus:
dM
dσ
= − ΨaΦσ − ΦaΨσ
ΦMΨa −ΨMΦa ,
dα
dσ
= −ΦMΨσ −ΨMΦσ
ΦMΨa −ΨMΦa . (37)
Choosing: X = (α− cL) and Y = (cH − cL), noting that ddσ (−cL) = ddσ (cH) =
√
3,
we have the following derivatives:
ΦM = −2 1M
(
k − wd
2
X
)
k
Φα = −2 1X
(
k − wd
2
X
) (
k + wd
2
X
)
+ 1
6
WLX
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Φσ =
√
3
(
2 1
X
(
k − wd
2
X
) (
2X−Y
Y
k − wd
2
X
)
+ 1
6
WLX
)
ΨM = −2 1M XY k2
Ψα = −
(
k2 − 1
4
(w2d +WL)X
2 + Fp
)
1
Y
Ψσ =
√
3
(
1
12
(w2d +WL) (3Y − 2X)X2 + (2X − Y ) k2 + (2X − Y )Fp
)
1
Y 2
Using Φ = 0 to replace Fp =
((
k − 1
2
wdX
)2
+ 1
12
WLX
2
)
in previous expressions,
after rearranging the terms and required simplifications, we have: ΦMΨα−ΨMΦα =
−wd
6
(24k2− 12wdXk−WLX2)Xk/ (MY ). Substituting wd ' 0.42 and WL ' 0.051,
and noting that
√
3k > Y ≥ X from Lemma 3, it emerges that the previous expres-
sion is negative. Thus, the sign of dM
dσ
and dα
dσ
is given by the sign of the numerators
of the expressions in (37).
Analogously: ΨaΦσ − ΦaΨσ = wd18 (72k3 − 60wdXk2 + 18w2dX2k − 3X3w3d −
WLwdX
3)X/Y 2, that is positive from similar reasonings, meaning dM
dσ
> 0. Fi-
nally: ΦMΨσ − ΨMΦσ = −
√
3wd
6
(24 (Y −X) k2 + 4wd (4X − 3Y )Xk − 2w2dX3 −
WLX
2Y )Xk/ (MY 2), which is negative from previous arguments, meaning dα
dσ
< 0.
If Φ (cH ,M, σ) > 0, then α
∗ = cH . Therefore: Ψ = k2 + (WL + w2d)σ
2 − Fp − FL
which is increasing in M and dα
∗
dσ
= cH
dσ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The second and third inequalities are obtained by
totally differentiating (19). The first inequality comes from the observation that
dividing both sides of (21) the left-hand side is independent of D.
Proof of Lemma 10. Profit (23) can be decomposed as:
E
[
Π˜n
]
=
D
2t
{
E [p˜np˜n−1]− 2E
[
p˜2n
]
+ 2E [c˜np˜n]− E [c˜np˜n−1]− E [c˜np˜n+1]
}
+
+
D
2t
{E [cnp˜n+1]}+ Dt
N2
− F . (38)
Each term is derived separately. See also: Alderighi and Piga (2012b).
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Part 10.I Under Assumption 1: E
[
(p˜n)
2] = σ2WI.0 (N) + c¯2 + 2c¯k + k2 where
WI.0 (N) =
∑l
i=l w
2
l−|i| > 0.
Derivation of Part 10.I. From (3): E
[
(p˜n)
2] = E [(∑li=l wl−|i| · c˜n+i)2] +
2E
[(∑l
i=l wl−|i| · c˜n+i
)]
k+k2. From Assumption 1, we know that E [c˜2n] = (σ
2 + c¯2),
and, since c˜n and c˜n+i are uncorrelated: E [c˜nc˜n+i] = c¯
2, with i ∈ L0. After some
manipulations we obtain the thesis. ♦
Part 10.II Under Assumption 1: E [p˜np˜n−1] = σ2WI.1 (N) + c¯2 + 2c¯k + k2 where
WI.1 (N) =
∑l
i=l wl−|i|wi−|i+1| > 0.
Derivation of Part 10.II. Similar to that of Part 10.I. ♦
Part 10.III Under Assumption 1: a) E [c˜np˜n] = σ
2wl+c¯
2+c¯k; and b) E [c˜np˜n−1] =
σ2wl−1 + c¯
2 + c¯k.
Derivation of Part 10.III. a) E [c˜np˜n] = E
[
c˜n
(∑l
i=l wl−|i| · c˜n+i + k
)]
. The
thesis follows from the same reasonings of Parts 10.I and 10.II by noting that the
weight associated to E [c˜2n] is wl. b). Similar to a). The weight of E [c˜
2
n] is wl−1. ♦
Note that E [p˜np˜n+1] = E [p˜np˜n−1] and E [cnp˜n+1] = E [cnp˜n−1]. After substi-
tuting the results from Parts 10.I, 10.II, and 10.III into (38), most of the terms
cancel out, finally yielding (23). To compute W¯I , use Lemma 1 and the numerical
algorithm described in fn 9.
Proof of Proposition 3. It derives directly from Lemma 10.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using (31), (32), Assumption 1 and noting that fixed
costs per consumer are FC = NF/D, the expected average social cost is:
E [C] = E [TC + V C + FC] =
(
t
4N
+
1
2
N
t
σ2
)
+
(
c¯− N
t
σ2
)
+
NF
D
(39)
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